Abstract An increasing trend in private international law cases decided by courts in the United Kingdom has been to refer to the European Convention on Human Rights and, in particular, to Article 6. This article will examine the impact of this provision on private international law. The article will go on to examine why the impact has been so limited and will put forward a new approach that takes human rights more seriously, using human rights law to identify problems and the flexibility inherent in private international law concepts to solve them.
particular cases. It will then consider why the impact of Article 6 has been so limited. Finally, it will suggest a new approach under which the impact of Article 6 will no longer be underplayed. Before this, a little needs to be said about Article 6, concentrating on those aspects of its scope and operation that have a potential impact on private international law.
II. ARTICLE 6(1) OF THE ECHR
As is well known, Article 6 of the ECHR is entitled 'Right To A Fair Trial' and paragraph (1) provides that 'In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. ' The right of access to the courts is not expressly guaranteed by Article 6(1). However, decisions of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) have made it clear that denial of access to national courts may amount to a breach of Article 6. 3 The right of access to a court is not absolute and may be subject to restrictions, provided that these pursue a legitimate aim and are proportionate. 4 
A. Direct effect and access to the UK courts
The primary focus of the ECHR is territorial; Contracting States are bound to respect the Convention rights of those within its borders. 5 A claim based on the Convention arises most commonly in the situation where a State is said to have acted within its own territory in a way which infringes the enjoyment of a Convention right by a person 6 within its territory. These are what Lord Bingham has referred to as domestic cases. 7 In other words, the contracting State is directly responsible, because of its own act or omission, for the breach of Convention rights. 8 In a domestic case, the state must always act in a way which is compatible with the Convention rights. There is no threshold test related to the seriousness of the violation or the importance of the right involved. 9 In private international law, the issue that will arise is whether the courts in the United Kingdom are in breach of Article 6 when they refuse to try a case. This denial may be on the ground that there is no basis of jurisdiction, that there is a limitation on jurisdiction, that a stay of the English proceedings should be granted, or that recognition of a foreign judgment creates a cause of action or issue estoppel.
B. Indirect effect and transfer abroad
The ECHR can also have indirect effect. This is where it is not that the State complained of has violated or will violate the applicant's Convention rights within its own territory but rather that the conduct of the State in removing a person from its territory (whether by compulsion or extradition) to another territory will lead to a violation of the applicant's Convention rights in that other territory. 10 These are what Lord Bingham has referred to as foreign cases. 11 They represent an exception to the general rule that a State is only responsible for what goes on within its own territory or control. 12 The ECtHR regards such cases as exceptional. 13 Judge Matscher in his concurring opinion in the ECtHR in Drozd and Janousek v France and Spain 14 has given two examples of where the Convention has indirect effect. The first is where a State may violate Articles 3 15 and or 6 of the Convention by ordering a person to be extradited or deported to a country, whether or not a Member State of the Convention, where he runs a real risk of suffering treatment contrary to those provisions of the Convention. This was established by the ECtHR in Soering v United Kingdom 16 and has been followed in a large number of ECtHR decisions 17 Article 6(1) of the ECHR and Private International Law 3
since Soering and Drozd and by the House of Lords. 18 As far as Article 6 is concerned, the breach must be a flagrant one. 19 Judge Matscher said that other hypothetical cases of an indirect effect of certain provisions of the Convention were also quite conceivable. Drozd has been recognized by the English courts as being an important case, notable for the concurring opinion of Judge Matscher. 20 The House of Lords has said that our obligations may be engaged where there is a real risk of particularly flagrant breaches of Articles other than Article 3 in the foreign country. 21 In particular, it has been accepted that, as a matter of principle, our obligations could be engaged by Article 8 22 in a civil case involving the return of a child to a foreign country. 23 However, there is great difficulty in relying on this concept of indirect effect and the exceptional nature of such cases has been recognized. In no indirect case has the former Commission or the ECtHR found a violation of Article 6. Moreover, it can be argued that, the recent introduction of a separate requirement for the provision of a domestic remedy in the State where the alleged direct breach of Article 6 occurred, 24 shifts the focus onto that State and thereby reduces the need to have a doctrine of indirect effect. In private international law, transfer abroad occurs whenever an English court stays its own proceedings in favour of an alternative forum abroad. 25 This is a very different situation from the example given by Judge Matscher in Drozd, which involved transferring a person abroad rather than transferring an action. 26 Nonetheless, it is arguable that, as far as Article 6 is concerned, the problem is essentially the same. As yet though, it is unclear whether the ECtHR or an English court would apply the indirect effect doctrine in such a case. 27 
C. Indirect effect and enforcement of foreign judgments
The second example given by Judge Matscher is concerned with enforcement of foreign judgments. A Contracting State may incur responsibility by reason of assisting in the enforcement of a foreign judgment, originating from a Contracting State or a non-Contracting State, which has been obtained in conditions which constitute a breach of Article 6, whether it is a civil or criminal judgment. 28 Judge Matscher went on to say that this must clearly be a flagrant breach of Article 6. Article 6 has in its indirect applicability only a reduced effect, less than it would have if directly applicable.
Is there a wider principle which does not require a 'flagrant' breach abroad, merely a breach of Article 6 requirements? The decision of the ECtHR in Pellegrini v Italy 29 is directly relevant to enforcement. The applicant's marriage was annulled by a decision of the Vatican courts which was declared enforceable by the Italian courts. The Vatican has not ratified the ECHR. An application was lodged against Italy alleging that the proceedings before the Italian courts for a declaration that the judgment of the Vatican courts was enforceable had been unfair. The ECtHR held that their task was not to examine whether the proceedings before the Vatican courts complied with Article 6 of the Convention, 30 but to examine whether the Italian courts, before authorizing enforcement of the decision annulling the marriage, duly satisfied themselves that the relevant (ie Vatican) 31 proceedings fulfilled the guarantees of Article 6. 32 It was said that a 'review of that kind is required where a decision in respect of which enforcement is requested emanates from the courts of a country which does not apply the Convention'. It is unclear whether Pellegrini applies where the judgment was granted in a ECHR State 33 (which would include all the EC Member States), it is at least arguable that it does so.
D . Obligations imposed by the Human Rights Act
Article 6 and the other Articles in the Convention 34 are incorporated into the law of the United Kingdom by the Human Rights Act 1998. The incorporated rights are referred to under the Act as 'the Convention rights'. A court or tribunal determining a question which has arisen in connection with a Convention right must 'take into account' any judgment 35 of the ECtHR so far as, in the opinion of the court or tribunal, it is relevant to the proceedings in (n 2), interpreted the 'relevant' proceedings as being those before the Italian courts for enforcement. But the ECtHR concluded that 'the Italian courts breached their duty of satisfying themselves . . . that the applicant had had a fair trial in the proceedings under canon law'. The House of Lords did not discuss this point. 32 Pellegrini (n 29) [40] . 33 P Kinsch (n 31) 227-8. 34 With the exception of Art 13. 35 Or decision, declaration or advisory opinion of that Court. which that question has arisen. 36 Taking into account does not mean that the court has to follow the judgment of the ECHR, it is merely of persuasive authority. However, whilst such case-law is not strictly binding, the courts should in the absence of some special circumstances, follow any clear and constant jurisprudence of the Strasbourg court. 37 The 1998 Act also provides that so far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation and subordinate legislation must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with the Convention rights. 38 Moreover, it is unlawful for a public authority, which includes a court, to act in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right. 39 When examining the impact of Article 6 in private international law cases, it will be necessary to see whether courts in the United Kingdom have: taken into account decisions of the ECtHR; construed legislation in a way that is compatible with Article 6 rights; and acted in a way which is compatible with Article 6 rights.
III. THE LIMITED IMPACT OF ARTICLE 6(1)

A. No impact on bases of jurisdiction
Denying access to the English courts
If the English court holds that there is no basis of jurisdiction, the consequence is to deny the claimant access to the English courts. Does this constitute a breach of the right to a fair hearing under Article 6? What little authority there is on this question has answered it in the negative. Thorpe LJ in the Court of Appeal in Mark v Mark 40 accepted that the State had the right to impose conditions and limitations on the right of access to the English courts. 41 This was said in a case where the statutory basis of jurisdiction was not challenged on human rights grounds. What was in issue was whether a limitation in relation to the connecting factor used under the statutory basis of jurisdiction infringed Article 6. Neither will the argument succeed that denying access to the English courts is a denial of access to the court of choice. This is clear from comments of Aikens J in OT Africa Line Ltd v Hijazy (The Kribi). 42 Aikens J said in response to the argument that an anti-suit injunction would have the effect of denying the defendants the right of access to a Court in an ECHR State that 'Article 6 of the ECHR does not provide that a person is to have an unfettered choice of tribunal in which to pursue or defend his civil rights. . . . Article 6 of the ECHR does not deal at all with where the right to a "fair and public hearing before an independent and impartial tribunal established by law" is to be exercised by a litigant. The crucial point is that civil rights must be determined somewhere by a hearing and before a tribunal in accordance with the provisions of Article 6.' 43 When it comes to what Article 6 does require, civil proceedings must be determined somewhere before a tribunal in accordance with Article 6. According to Aikens J, if a court determines that the parties themselves have agreed to determine their rights exclusively in the court of a particular country (and one that is a contracting party to the ECHR) then the Article 6 right is on the face of it upheld. Looking in more detail at what Article 6 requires it can be seen that there are two aspects to this. First, there must be trial somewhere. Taken literally, this would suggest that an English court would be in breach of Article 6 if England was the only forum available but refused to try the case. Second, the trial must be before a tribunal in accordance with Article 6, ie there is a fair and public hearing before an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. The fact that the trial must be before a tribunal in accordance with Article 6 acknowledges that if trial is in England this must be in accordance with Article 6. The Kribi involved jurisdiction under the Brussels Convention but what was said about human rights, choice of forum and the basis of jurisdiction must apply equally to bases of jurisdiction under the English traditional national rules.
Granting access in the forum and thereby denying access abroad
So far we have been considering whether denial of access to the English courts constitutes an infringement of Article 6. But the same question can arise in relation to the converse situation. In other words, will the granting of access to the English courts constitute an infringement of Article 6 in that it leads to a denial of access to a court abroad? Under the Brussels I Regulation, the granting of access to the courts in one State leads to a denial of access in another State because of mechanical rules on lis pendens and related actions. 44 If you follow what was said by Aikens J in The Kribi, the argument, that granting access in England leads to a denial of access abroad, is doomed to fail because Article 6 does not provide that a person is to have an unfettered choice of tribunal. Indeed, Aikens J was influenced to come to this conclusion by the realization that if he accepted that a person did have an unfettered choice, taken to its logical conclusion, this would mean that the above argument could be raised in relation to the basis of jurisdiction.
No fair trial in England
This allegation was raised in the private international law context in AG of Zambia v Meer Care and Desai (a firm), 45 where a stay of English proceedings was sought on two grounds. First, that the defendants would not receive a fair trial in England (arguing that bail conditions set in Zambia prevented the defendants from taking part effectively in the English proceedings) and, second, on forum non conveniens grounds. These were regarded as substantially overlapping grounds and the case was regarded as one where the defendants were arguing that it would be fairer to them to have trial in Zambia. The stay was refused using forum non conveniens criteria. The judge decided the case looking at the whole picture, ie the position of the claimant and of other defendants if a stay were to be granted, rather than focusing on whether the defendants would receive a fair trial in England. No decisions of the ECtHR on Article 6 were cited.
B. No impact on the exercise of the discretionary element 1. Forum conveniens
Cases where an English court is asked to exercise its discretionary power to permit service out of the jurisdiction can raise questions in relation to the direct effect of Article 6. This is illustrated by Dow Jones & Co Inc v Yousef Abdul Latif Jameel, 46 which concerned the publication in an online journal of an allegedly defamatory story. The journal was placed on a World Wide Web site, access to which was available to subscribers. Only five subscribers accessed the article and three of these were from the claimants' camp. There was therefore only minimal publication in England. The Court of Appeal struck out the claim as being an abuse of process. It was argued by the claimants that to do so would infringe Article 6 of the ECHR. This argument was rejected by the Court of Appeal in the following terms: 'We do not consider that this Article requires the provision of a fair and public hearing in relation to an alleged infringement of rights when the alleged infringement is shown not to be real or substantial'. 47 Jurisdiction was no longer an issue by this stage but it was clear that if earlier there had been an application to set aside permission to serve the proceedings out of the jurisdiction this would have been granted on the basis that the five publications that had taken place in England did not, individually or collectively, amount to a real and substantial tort. 48 The case is authority for the obvious point that just because access is denied to the English courts does not necessarily mean a breach of Article 6. It must depend on the circumstances of the case. The Court would be decid-ing the case applying the private international law criterion of forum conveniens, 49 which in defamation cases considers the question whether a real and substantial tort has been committed within the jurisdiction, 50 assuming that this meets human rights requirements.
Stays of action
In forum non conveniens cases, Article 6 concerns are raised in three different ways: because of a denial of access; because of a delay in trial; and, in some cases, because of a breach of the right to a fair trial abroad.
(a) A denial of access
The first, and most basic, way in which Article 6 concerns are raised is because of the denial of access to the English courts, which is the inevitable consequence of staying the English proceedings and, in effect, transferring the action abroad. Does this involve a breach of Article 6 by the English courts? This is asking essentially the same question as was asked earlier when we considered whether denying access to the English courts because there was no basis of jurisdiction was an infringement of Article 6. What was said in The Kribi is equally pertinent here. What Article 6 requires is that there is a trial somewhere and that this is before a tribunal in accordance with the requirements of Article 6. It does not matter that this trial is abroad.
(b) A delay in trial
The second way in which Article 6 concerns are raised relates to the inevitable delay involved when an English court considers whether a stay should be granted on the ground of forum non conveniens and the even greater delay in trial of the merits if a stay is granted. Does this delay involve a breach of the right under Article 6 to a fair hearing within a reasonable time? This is a concern that has been raised by Advocate General Leger in Owusu v Jackson, 51 who said the grant of a stay on forum non conveniens grounds, because of the delay involved, could be regarded as being incompatible with the requirements of Article 6. However, this concern does not appear to have been discussed in the English courts.
(c) A breach abroad
The third way in which Article 6 concerns are raised relates to a possible breach of the right to a fair trial by a foreign court. For example, the alternative forum abroad may be one where there are substantial delays before the case is tried or one where there is a question mark over the independence and impartiality of the judiciary. How should concern over this be reflected in the 53 Under these principles a stay will not be granted where it is established by cogent evidence that the claimant will not obtain justice in the foreign forum. Lord Bingham had earlier concluded that a stay would lead to injustice to the claimants. This was because he could not conceive that the court would grant a stay in any case where adequate funding and legal representation of the claimant were judged to be necessary to the doing of justice and these were clearly shown to be unavailable in the foreign forum, although available in England. He then dismissed the human rights argument in one sentence: 'I do not think article 6 supports any conclusion which is not already reached on application of Spiliada principles.' 54 The result is not one that gives rise to human rights concerns. The House of Lords did not, in effect, transfer the case to the courts of South Africa and so concerns about a possible breach of Article 6 requirements if trial had been held there were groundless. However, the technique used in the case does give rise to a concern that in the future there could be a transfer to a country where trial would involve a breach of these requirements. The Spiliada principles were examined first and only then was the human rights point considered. Having concluded, after applying Spiliada principles, that no stay should be granted it was thought not necessary to consider the human rights point. This was the opposite technique to that adopted in The Kribi, where the human rights points were considered first, before considering private international principles. This was regarded as being the logical order for dealing with these points. Putting the private international law point first gives the impression that these rules deal with the human rights concern so there is no such concern. The statement from Lord Bingham, that he did not think that Article 6 supported any conclusion which was not already reached on application of Spiliada principles, reinforces this impression. On the facts of the case Article 6 did not support any conclusion which is not already reached on application of Spiliada principles. But what if the facts were different? It is interesting to speculate on what would have happened if the application of the Spiliada principles had led to the conclusion that there had been no injustice abroad, ie no injustice in the private international law sense. Would the Court have then concluded that Article 6 does not support any conclusion which is not already reached on application of Spiliada principles? The technique adopted by the House of Lords leads to a very real danger that this is what may happen. The case is decided one way or the other applying private international law principles and human rights principles are regarded as being irrelevant. 55 It is right to call this a danger because application of human rights principles may in fact reveal that there would be a breach of Article 6 if trial were held abroad. In other words, the idea of injustice in private international may not be coterminous with that of a fair trial under Article 6. It may be a narrower idea. 56 If an English court were to transfer an action to a foreign State in which, in the circumstances of the case, there is a real risk of a flagrant breach of Article 6 standards, it is arguable that the English court would itself be in breach of Article 6 under the indirect effect doctrine. If so, it would also be in breach of section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 because it has acted in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right. Finally, it is at least arguable that, if a court were to follow the Lubbe approach on the same facts now, it would be in breach of the obligation under section 2 of the Human Rights Act 1998 57 to take into account any decisions of the ECtHR relevant to the proceedings since it would be ignoring a decision of the ECtHR deciding that the unavailability of legal representation before the courts of a State can constitute a breach of Article 6 by that State. 58 
Restraining foreign proceedings (a) Does the grant of an injunction constitute a breach of Article 6(1)?
Where an injunction is granted by the English courts restraining the commencement or continuance of proceedings abroad, there is a denial of access to the court abroad. Is this a breach of the claimant's right to a fair and public hearing? Or does this only refer to denial of access to the English courts? This question arose in The Kribi, 59 in which the claimants sought, inter alia, an anti-suit injunction restraining the defendants from continuing proceedings commenced against them in Belgium. The defendants responded by raising two points under the Human Rights Act. The first was that section 3 of that act required the court to interpret section 37 of the Supreme Court Act 1981 (giving the court power to grant injunctions) in a way that is compatible with the ECHR, in particular the rights in Article 6. An anti-suit injunction would have the effect of denying the defendants (all of whom were domiciled in States that are a party to the ECHR) the right of access to a Court in an ECHR State, ie Belgium. The power granted to the English Court should therefore be construed so as to exclude the power to grant an anti-injunction where it would have this effect. Alternatively, it would be unlawful under section 6 of the Act for the court to grant an anti-suit injunction that would have the intention or effect of depriving the defendants of access to the Belgian courts because that would be incompatible with those parties' rights under Article 6 of the ECHR. Therefore the court could not grant an anti-suit injunction. Both arguments hinged on the question whether the denial of access to the Belgian courts was incompatible with Article 6 of the ECHR. Aikens J held that it was not. 60 This was because Article 6 does not provide that a person is to have an unfettered choice of tribunal in which to pursue or defend his civil rights. It followed that there was also no need to construe section 37 of the Supreme Court Act 1981 in a way that restricted the power of the court to grant anti-suit injunctions. The ground on which the injunction was granted was that the bringing of proceedings abroad had been a breach of an exclusive jurisdiction agreement. 61 The use of this ground was upheld by Aikens J, who, it will be recalled, said that, if a court determines that the parties themselves have agreed to determine their rights exclusively in the court of a particular country (and one that is a Contracting party to the ECHR), the Article 6 right is on the face of it upheld. 62 However, there is one possible situation where the grant of an anti-suit injunction is now in doubt. This is where it is a single forum case, ie the injunction relates to proceedings in the only State in which the claimant could bring a successful action. 63 There is a well-known instance of an anti-suit injunction being granted in this situation. The requirement stressed by Aikens J that there must be a trial somewhere suggests that the grant of an injunction in such circumstances would be incompatible with Article 6 of the ECHR.
Although in The Kribi the human rights argument failed, this was a case where human rights concerns were treated seriously by counsel and the judge. The argument was rejected after examining what Article 6 requires. Reference was also made to the requirements of the Human Rights Act. Moreover, the order in which points raised by the defendants were dealt with by the judge is significant. The defendants had also raised a number of arguments to the effect that granting an anti-suit injunction in the circumstances of the case would be inconsistent with the Brussels Convention. However, Aikens J thought that logically the human rights points came first. 64 
(b) Does the refusal to grant an injunction constitute a breach of
Article 6(1)? If there has been a breach of the right to a fair trial abroad and the English court refuses to grant an injunction, is it then itself in breach of Article 6? The decision of the Court of Appeal in Al-Bassam v Al-Bassam 65 indicates that it would not be. Lewison J, at first instance, when exercising his discretion to grant an anti-suit injunction in relation to proceedings in Saudi Arabia, had been influenced (ie this was a factor to be taken into account rather than determinative of the issue) by the perception that the claimant would not receive a fair trial in that country. The Court of Appeal held that he had exercised his discretion in a way that was substantially flawed. The Court agreed that Lewison J was correct to be concerned that a judgment given abroad in proceedings which, in the eyes of English law, had failed to meet the requirements of a fair trial should not be recognized in England. However, the Court regarded this as being a matter that arose after the foreign judgment was given, when the English court applied its own rules on recognition of foreign judgments, rather than at the earlier stage of restraining the foreign proceedings before a judgment was given. Chadwick LJ, giving the unanimous judgment of the Court, said that 'It is not for the English court to restrain a party in proceedings before it from suing in another jurisdiction on the grounds of its own perception as to the fairness or unfairness of proceedings in that other jurisdiction-a fortiori, where the country in which the party seeks to sue is not itself bound by the European Convention'. 66 In explanation of why it was not for the English court to so act, it was said that this would go 'well beyond anything necessary to protect its own process'. This shows a reluctance to alter private international rules to take account of human rights concerns.
C. No exception to lis pendens under the Brussels I Regulation
The concern here is with a possible breach of the right to a fair trial in another Member State. Where the court of a Member State second seised is required to stay its proceedings or decline jurisdiction under Articles 27 or 28 of the Brussels I Regulation (ex Articles 21 and 22 of the Brussels Convention) in favour of the court first seised, this may result in trial before a court which denies the defendant a fair trial. Should the court second seised stay or decline jurisdiction in such a case? This question arose in Erich Gasser GMBH v Misat SRL. 67 The Higher regional Court in Innsbruck referred a number of questions to the European Court of Justice (ECJ), one of which was, in essence, whether an exception may be allowed to Article 21 of the Brussels Convention where, generally, proceedings before the courts of the Contracting State of the court first seised take an unreasonably long time.
This question was submitted because the court first seised was in Italy. The seller argued that, in Roman law countries such as Italy, Greece, and France, legal proceedings generally last an unreasonably long time and this was said to be contrary to Article 6 of the ECHR. The seller argued that proceedings were excessively protracted where their duration exceeded three years. And that where no decision on jurisdiction had been given within six months following the commencement of proceedings before the court first seised, or no final decision on jurisdiction had been given within one year following the commencement of those proceedings, it is appropriate to decline to apply Article 21 of the Brussels Convention. The courts of the Contracting State second seised should then be able to rule on jurisdiction and, after slightly longer periods, on the substance of the case. This argument did not refer to this particular action before the Tribunale civile e penale di Roma and the delay involved, but instead to where proceedings before the courts of the Contracting State first seised 'generally' last an unreasonably long time. There was no evidence as to what delays constituted a breach of Article 6 and no decisions of the ECtHR were referred to; in particular there was no mention of the scores of decisions of that Court condemning the delays in trial in the civil courts of the various regions of Italy. 68 Neither was any reference made to the hundreds of reports of the European Commission of Human Rights resulting in resolutions by the Committee of Ministers finding Italy in breach of Article 6 for the same reason. 69 The ECJ held that Article 21 cannot be derogated from where, in general, the duration of proceedings before the courts of the Brussels Convention Contracting State first seised is excessively long. Such a derogation would be manifestly contrary both to the letter and spirit and to the aim of the Convention. The way the Article 6 point was argued meant that the ECJ was being asked to say that there should always be an exception where the court first seised was in certain Member States, ie Italy, France, or Greece. 70 One can understand the ECJ baulking at this. Would the decision of the ECJ have been any different if the Article 6 argument had been more focused? This could be done by focusing on Italy and presenting the specific evidence that exists of the condemnation by the ECtHR of delays in that country. It could be further focused by looking at specific evidence of delays before the Tribunale civile e penale di Roma and at the delay in this particular case. The ECJ heard the case some three and a half years after proceedings commenced in Italy and the Italian court seemingly had not established that it had jurisdiction, let alone decided the case on its merits. The strongest argument for an exception to Article 21 would arise if the ECtHR had actually condemned the delay before the Tribunale civile e penale di Roma in this particular case. But even without this, it could be argued that, in the particular circumstances of the case, there was a real risk of a breach of Article 6 if trial were to be held in Italy. It could also be argued that, by virtue of the indirect effect doctrine, the court second seised would itself be in breach of Article 6 by declining jurisdiction in favour of the court first seised in the circumstances in Gasser.
The human rights argument would have been much stronger if it had been more focused, 71 and this would have been against a background of an ECJ that takes human rights seriously. The ECJ has consistently held that fundamental rights form an integral part of the general principles of Community law, the observance of which it ensures. 72 In protecting these rights, the ECJ draws inspiration from the guidelines supplied by international treaties for the protection of human rights. Amongst these, the ECHR has been recognized as having special significance 73 and the ECJ has referred extensively to its provisions and to the Strasbourg jurisprudence. 74 In particular, the ECJ has expressly recognized the general principle of Community law that everyone is entitled to a fair process, which is inspired by these fundamental rights. 75 This case-law on fundamental rights is embodied in a number of treaty provisions, 76 including the Treaty on European Union. 77 For its part, the ECtHR has 71 This might have convinced the Commission to argue for an exception. One of the arguments put forward by it against the exception was that it was for the ECtHR to determine whether in the particular circumstances the delay was such that the interests of a party were seriously affected. recognized that the protection of fundamental rights by EC law can be considered to be 'equivalent' to that of the ECHR system. 78 These Community law developments were referred to and influenced the ECJ in Krombach v Bamberski, 79 when setting limits on the public policy defence to recognition of foreign judgments under the Brussels Convention. The concept of public policy has the flexibility to take on board easily human rights concerns. The difficulty in Gasser was that the lis pendens rule has no inherent flexibility and the only way of taking on board human rights concerns is by creating an exception to the lis pendens rule, which would have involved judicial redrafting of the Brussels Convention. The ECJ in Gasser was clearly not prepared to do this and stressed the need to uphold the objectives of the Brussels Convention. 80 It follows that, even if the human rights argument had been put in a more attractive and focused way, the result would probably have been the same, with the clash between, on the one hand, upholding human rights values and, on the other hand, the objectives of the Brussels Convention being decided in favour of the latter. 81 
D. A mixed reaction to blanket limitations on jurisdiction
Limitations on jurisdiction operate so as to deny the claimant access to the English courts. Does this constitute a breach of the right to a fair hearing under Article 6?
This question has arisen before the English courts in two different contexts: State immunity, which operates as a direct limitation on jurisdiction, and the acquisition of an habitual residence in England for the purpose of divorce jurisdiction, which operates as an indirect limitation on jurisdiction. In the former context, a blanket limitation on jurisdiction has been accepted. In the latter, a rule which operated as a blanket limitation on jurisdiction has been recast in the light of Article 6 concerns.
A direct limitation
Sovereign immunity is a public international law doctrine but one that is of considerable interest to the private international lawyer because of its opera-tion as a direct limitation on jurisdiction. The relationship between sovereign immunity and human rights was considered by the ECtHR in Al-Adsani v United Kingdom, 82 which involved civil proceedings brought against a foreign State following alleged torture in that State. The ECtHR accepted that, in a case of sovereign immunity, the right of access to a court under Article 6 was engaged. 83 However, the majority (by nine to eight) held that there had been no violation of Article 6, reasoning as follows: to be compatible with Article 6, the limitation had to pursue a legitimate aim and be proportionate. 84 The ECtHR considered that 'the grant of sovereign immunity to a State in civil proceedings pursues the legitimate aim of complying with international law to promote comity and good relations between States through the respect of another State's sovereignty'. 85 Moreover, the restriction was proportionate to the aim pursued since State immunity reflects 'a generally accepted rule of international law'. 86 Subsequently, the English courts in Jones v Ministry of the Interior of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 87 have been faced with a more complex case where, following alleged torture abroad, civil claims for damages were brought against both a foreign State, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and individual defendants who were officials of that State. The Court of Appeal 88 followed the ECtHR in Al-Adsani, 89 as well as general principles of interpretation of the ECHR laid down by the ECtHR in other cases, 90 and held that the Kingdom was entitled to immunity. However, Mance LJ, with whom Neuberger LJ and Lord Phillips MR concurred, rejected a blanket limitation in relation to the claims against individual defendants on the ground that torture was a crime under international law, 91 could not be treated as the exercise of a State function, and a civil action against individual torturers did not indirectly implead the State. He adopted a flexible 'proportionate' approach, which required an English court to consider all relevant factors, including any evidence before it as to the availability or otherwise of any effective remedy for the torture in the State responsible for it. 92 Mance LJ's judgment was a radical one, very much concerned with human rights concerns, which he regarded as a separate ground for refusing immunity from the international law ground used to reject a blanket limitation on jurisdiction. 93 The House of Lords agreed with the Court of Appeal that the Kingdom was entitled to immunity. 94 In so deciding it was very much influenced by the decision of the ECtHR in Al-Adsani. 95 But it regarded the position of individual defendants as being the same as that of the Kingdom 96 with the result that immunity also applied in relation to the claims against the individual defendants.
The Law Lords started with the finding that, on a straightforward application of the State Immunity Act 1978, immunity would apply in relation both to the Kingdom and to the individual defendants. 97 The claimants argued that to apply the 1978 Act would be incompatible with the right of access to the English courts provided by Article 6. Their Lordships expressed doubts 98 as to the correctness of the unanimous decision of the ECtHR in Al-Adsani that Article 6 was engaged in a case of State immunity but was prepared to assume that it was. 99 The grant of immunity plainly would deny access to the English courts. 100 The claimants sought to show that the restriction imposed by the law of State immunity was disproportionate by arguing that the prescription of torture by international law, having the authority of a peremptory norm (superior in effect to other rules of international law), 101 precludes the grant of immunity to States or individuals sued for committing acts of torture since such acts cannot be governmental acts or exercises of State authority entitled to protection of State immunity ratione materiae. 102 The House of Lords was unable to accept that torture cannot be a governmental or official act. 103 Their Lordships focused on the fact that the lack of access was not disproportionate (and hence contrary to Article 6) because international law 104 has not yet reached the point where State immunity in civil proceedings is accepted as not applying in cases involving torture. 105 
An indirect limitation
The way in which an indirect limitation can arise is illustrated by Mark v Mark. 106 The English court's jurisdiction to entertain an application for a divorce was dependent on the petitioner wife, a Nigerian national, being either habitually resident for one year ending on the date when proceedings were begun or domiciled in England and Wales. 107 Hughes J, at first instance, had held that she could not be regarded as being habitually resident or domiciled in England since her presence in the UK was unlawful. 108 This led to an appeal on the ground that the judge's conclusion deprived the wife of the right to present her petition contrary to Article 6 of the ECHR. Thorpe LJ in the Court of Appeal 109 held that the wife's Article 6 rights were engaged. By way of explanation, he referred to 'decisions of the Strasbourg courts' (without saying what they were), 110 deciding that denial of a right of access to national courts may amount to a breach of Article 6(1). He accepted that the State had the right to impose conditions and limitations on the right of access to the English courts. But what was at issue here was not the statutory basis of jurisdiction itself but a rule of public policy as set out by Lord Scarman in R v Barnet
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London Borough Council, ex p Nilish Shah, 111 providing that only a person lawfully in the UK could be regarded as being habitually resident there. The essential question for Thorpe LJ was whether this public policy rule should now be recast in the light of the Human Rights Act 1998. 112 Such a rule would deny the wife access to the divorce court with which she had the closest connection. Moreover, this would be after the rejection of an application for a stay in earlier proceedings, in the course of which considerations of fairness and convenience were fully canvassed. After considering the circumstances of the case, including the fact that the husband invited the wife to petition in London, the husband admitted the court's jurisdiction and there had been extensive proceedings in England in relation to the matrimonial home, Thorpe LJ concluded that a rule of public policy that terminated proceedings so far advanced would be incompatible with the wife's rights under Article 6(1). 113 Waller LJ was inclined not to regard Lord Scarman's rule as a blanket one. 114 Moreover, in a case like the instant one, where England was the only realistic forum, such a rule would risk infringing Article 6. 115 The House of Lords 116 affirmed this decision but on a different ground. Baroness Hale 117 did not consider that there was any need to found the decision on the Human Rights Act. 118 There never was a blanket limitation in the first place so there was no need to recast the limitation in the light of Article 6. In her view, Lord Scarman regarded the question he was dealing with as one of statutory construction, not of public policy. His comments were made in the context of entitlement to benefits. Baroness Hale could see no reason for implying the word 'lawfully' into a statute dealing with divorce jurisdiction. It followed that residence for the purposes of habitual residence in the context of matrimonial jurisdiction need not be lawful residence. 119 
E. Direct effect and recognition of a foreign judgment
We are concerned here with the estoppel effect of a foreign judgment. This prevents re-litigation of the original cause of action in England and of issues determined during that action. The principles upon which cause of action and issue estoppel are based are well known. 120 edged in the Court of Appeal that the application of these principles involves a denial of the right of access to the courts conferred by common law and this is a right protected by the ECHR. 121 Thus the estoppel principles 'should only be applied where the circumstances are such that their application is necessary to prevent misuse of the court's procedure amounting to an abuse of process'. 122 This was said in the context of a purely domestic case, but applies equally where there is a foreign judgment. 123 In practical terms, this may not represent any real change since it has long been accepted that estoppels must be applied so as to work justice and not injustice. 124
F. Indirect effect and enforcement of foreign judgments
The concern here is with a possible breach of the right to a fair trial in the foreign judgment granting State. We are therefore concerned with the indirect effect of Article 6. If there is such a breach abroad would the English courts, by recognizing and enforcing the foreign judgment, be in breach of Article 6? This question arises in cases of recognition and enforcement under both traditional English rules and the Brussels regime.
Recognition and enforcement under traditional English rules
The Court of Appeal in Al-Bassam v Al-Bassam 125 said that Lewison J, at first instance, was correct to voice his concern that the judgment of a foreign court given in proceedings which, in the eyes of English law, had failed to meet the requirements of a fair trial, would not be recognized in England. 126 This was because an English court when applying its rules on recognition of foreign judgments 'will have regard to its own obligation to act in a manner which is not inconsistent with the Convention right to a fair trial'. 127 Although the decision of the ECtHR in Pellegrini v Italy was cited to the Court, it did not accept that the ECHR had indirect effect. The reason why a foreign judgment, granted in circumstances where a fair trial had been denied abroad, would not be recognized, was not because human rights law says it should not be, but because the English rules on recognition say it should not be. However, the human rights position was not irrelevant. When operating the private international law rules on recognition of foreign judgments, account would be taken of the human rights position. This is an example of the approach, discussed later, whereby human rights law is used to cast light upon private international law concepts. 129 Burnton J, at first instance, had decided that it would not be contrary to the interests of justice to do so, even though the order would have been made in breach of the requirements of Article 6 of the ECHR if that Article had applied to the making of that order (which it did not because it was made in the US). On appeal to the Court of Appeal, it was argued that: (i) if the ECHR had applied in the United States, the confiscation order would have been made in contravention of Article 6 and of Article 1 of Protocol 1 in the ECHR; (ii) this being the case, if the courts registered the order, they would be contravening section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998. The Court of Appeal did not accept that there had been a breach by the United States' courts of the standards required by Article 6. But even if there had been such a breach, it could not be said that the decision to register gave rise to any breach of Article 6 of the Convention by the English court. Lord Carswell in the House of Lords followed the dictum of Judge Matscher in the Drozd case and accepted that enforcement of a foreign judgment might in principle give rise to responsibility on the part of a Convention State. 130 However, under this principle there must be a flagrant breach of Article 6 and on the facts of the instant case there was no such breach. The fugitive disentitlement doctrine applied in the US, although it failed to secure all of the protection required by Article 6, was said to be a rational approach which had commended itself to the federal jurisdiction in the US. As such, it could not be described as a flagrant breach.
The House of Lords discussed whether the decision of the ECtHR in Pellegrini v Italy, 131 gave rise to a wider principle under which it was not necessary to show that there had been a flagrant breach abroad. This important case was not cited to the Court of Appeal but on appeal was cited to the House of Lords. Pellegrini looks to be directly analogous to the situation in the Montgomery case. Indeed, commentators 132 have criticized the Court of Appeal's decision for appearing to get the human rights law wrong by ignoring Pellegrini. However, the House of Lords has confounded the critics by distinguishing Pellegrini and affirming the decision of the Court of Appeal.
Pellegrini was distinguished on the basis that it turned on the relationship between the Italian civil courts and the Vatican court. This was a special legal relationship between States which was governed by the 'Concordat'. The Italian courts were specifically obliged to ensure that the procedure (in the Vatican court) was sufficient to satisfy the terms of Article 6 of the Convention. 133 This confines the Pellegrini case to its facts, ie the enforcement of Vatican court judgments in Italy. According to this view, it is therefore not an authority in the private international law situation where the courts in one State are being asked to recognize and enforce the judgment granted in another State. This is an example of the English courts getting human rights law wrong and will be considered further below.
Recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments under the EC regime
In 134 the parties agreed that the Court of Session could not lawfully enforce a decree that had been granted by a foreign court, in civil proceedings in which, when the proceedings were looked at as a whole, the Article 6(1) Convention rights of the party, against whom that decree had been pronounced, had been infringed, without itself acting in violation of the requirements of Article 6(1) and the provisions of section 6(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998. This accepts that the ECHR has indirect effect and that the effect to be given to the Convention is a wide one. There is no requirement of a flagrant breach of Article 6(1) rights abroad, merely that there has been a breach. In this, it goes further than the House of Lords were prepared to go in the Montgomery case. Although Pellegrini was not cited to the Court of Session, it adopted the wide view of the indirect effect of the ECHR in enforcement cases, as is suggested by that decision. However, on the facts it was held that there had been no breach of the respondent's Article 6 rights in France. But it is clear that, if there had been such a breach (which in turn would have meant that the Court of Session would have been in breach if it had recognized the judgment), this would have been dealt with by refusing to recognize the foreign judgment using the public policy defence under the Brussels Convention, rather than by giving human rights law primacy and refusing recognition on the basis that the indirect effect doctrine says that the judgment cannot be recognized. This private international law public policy based approach has been used consistently to deal with breaches of Article 6 abroad in cases of recognition and enforcement under the Brussels Convention. It is an example of using Article 6 to cast light on a private international law concept, in this case that of public policy. It is to this approach that we will now turn.
SA Marie Brizzard et Roger International v William Grant & Sons Ltd (No 2),
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G. Taking the ECHR into account to shine light on private international law concepts
Private international law has a number of flexible concepts that could be used to respond to human rights concerns. The first of these is public policy, where it has been so used. The second is the demands of justice, where it has not been so used.
Public policy
Human rights law has been used to cast light on the meaning of public policy in the context of choice of law. It is well recognized that an important instance of where the English courts will disregard a provision in a foreign law is where this constitutes a gross infringement of human rights. 135 Article 6 is not raised in this context, 136 although other Articles in the ECHR may be. 137 More importantly in relation to Article 6, human rights law has been used to cast light on the meaning of public policy in the context of recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments under the EC rules.
(a) Recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments under the EC rules: the link with human rights
In 1999 the French Cour de cassation refused to enforce an English judgment for costs in a defamation action on the ground that this would be contrary to public policy under Article 27(1) of the Brussels Convention because the costs were set at a disproportionately high level. 138 It was said that the high costs of litigation had presented an obstacle to access to justice in England contrary to Article 6(1).
This links public policy and a breach of Article 6 rights. More generally on this link, it was said that the right of access to the courts established by Article 6(1) of the ECHR 'related' to public policy within the meaning of Article 27(1) of the Brussels Convention. This raises questions as to the precise nature of the link between public policy and a breach of Article 6. Will a breach of the latter always lead to the conclusion that the public policy defence applies and how is a breach of Article 6 to be established? Guidance on the answer to these questions can be found in the leading case on enforcement of foreign judgments, public policy and human rights, Krombach v Bamberski. 139 The ECJ, when setting limits on the concept of public policy under Article 27(1) of the Brussels Convention, said that it 'draws inspiration' from the guidelines provided by the ECHR. 140 Recourse to public policy was only possible where there is infringement of a fundamental principle of the recognizing Brussels Convention Contracting State. The Court went on to decide that, in the light of the case-law of the ECtHR, a national court of a Brussels Convention Contracting State is entitled to hold that a refusal in the judgment granting State to hear the defence of an accused person who is not present at the hearing constitutes a manifest breach of a fundamental right and that recourse can be had to the public policy provision.
In determining whether there has been a breach of a fundamental right, the ECJ was guided by the case-law of the ECtHR. Krombach concerned a judgment for compensation, which was granted by a French court (which also heard criminal proceedings) in circumstances where the defence counsel instructed by the defendant was not heard. The defendant had been ordered to appear before the court but had not done so. Accordingly, he was in contempt of court and no defence counsel could appear on his behalf. The ECJ followed decisions of the ECtHR in cases relating to criminal charges that held that, although not absolute, the right of every person charged with an offence to be effectively defended by a lawyer, if need be one appointed by the court, is one of the fundamental elements in a fair trial and an accused person does not forfeit entitlement to such a right simply because he is not present at the hearing. 141 There was no suggestion from the ECJ that the ECHR had indirect effect. This was so even though the violation of the right of defence was regarded as being particularly serious in that the defendant had given notice of his intention to defend himself and the French court refused his request in accordance with the French rules of procedure. 142 This could be regarded as a flagrant breach of ECHR rights. However, it is not surprising that there was no such suggestion from the ECJ. The reference from the Bundesgerichtshof was in terms of the interpretation of the public policy defence to recognition under the Brussels Convention. The ECJ was not asked whether the ECHR had indirect effect and, if so, how this would square with the provisions of the Brussels Convention. No doubt if it had been asked this latter question, it would have answered it by emphasizing the need to uphold the objectives of the Brussels Convention, as it did in the Gasser case. 145 pointing out that he had a statutory duty to do so because of section 2(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998. Turning to the facts of the case, the issue arose whether proceedings before the Tribunal de Commerce de Bordeaux, which it was alleged failed to comply with Article 6(1) requirements, should be considered in isolation or whether account should be taken of the whole proceedings in France, including proceedings before the appellate courts (which were not suggested to be not fully compliant with Article 6(1)). There was nothing in the Strasbourg jurisprudence to suggest the former. Indeed, there were observations supporting the latter. Taking account of the whole proceedings, Lord Mackay reached the conclusion that the respondent had failed to establish that its Article 6(1) rights had been breached in France. Despite this result, this is a case that takes human rights seriously in terms of the link between human rights and public policy (breach of Article 6(1) leading seemingly automatically to use of the public policy defence) and in terms of technique (ie taking into account decisions of the ECtHR). The French Cour de cassation has adopted a similar approach to that in Scotland, also accepting that a breach of Article 6 falls within the public policy defence. 146 However, it does not appear to have looked at the jurisprudence of the ECtHR when determining whether there had been such a breach abroad. In contrast, the English Court of Appeal in Maronier v Larmer 147 can in a number of respects be regarded as having taken human rights less seriously. First and foremost, it has sought to reduce the human rights impact of Krombach. The alleged human rights breach abroad arose out of an action in the Netherlands for medical negligence which was stayed and then after 12 years reactivated. The defendant was unaware that the proceedings had been reactivated until even the time for an appeal had passed. The Court of Appeal held that the respondent had not received a fair trial in the Netherlands as required by Article 6 and therefore it was against public policy to enforce the applicant's judgment. Whilst this result may appear to indicate that the Court was taking human rights seriously, the reality is that the emphasis in the case was more on the operation of the Brussels Convention than on human rights concerns. The Court pointed out that one of the fundamental objectives of the Convention was to 'facilitate, to the greatest extent possible, the free movement of judgments by providing for a simple and rapid enforcement procedure'. 148 This, it was said, would be frustrated if courts of an enforcing State could be required to carry out a detailed review of whether the procedures that resulted in the judgment had complied with Article 6. Accordingly, it reduced the impact of the human rights dimension by introducing a 'strong presumption that the procedures of other signatories of the human rights convention are compliant with Article 6'. There is no mention of such a presumption in Krombach. The introduction of this presumption puts the Brussels Convention first and the ECHR a poor second. The second way in which the Court of Appeal can be regarded as not taking human rights as seriously as the Scots court is that it considered Brussels Convention cases on public policy and natural justice but did not refer to any decisions of the ECtHR. 149 Thirdly, there was no suggestion in Maronier that the ECHR had indirect effect. 150 The Irish Supreme Court in In the matter of Eurofoods IFSC Ltd 151 can be accused of taking human rights even less seriously. It held that it would be manifestly contrary to public policy to recognize a decision of an Italian court where a provisional liquidator was not given the protection of fundamental aspects of fair procedures by being refused any copy of the petition or any other papers which the appellant intended to place before that court for the purpose of the opening of insolvency proceedings. Although the Court purported to apply Krombach, it did not follow the approach in that case. There was no enquiry into whether there had been a breach of a fundamental right, ie it did not use the language of rights, and guidance was not sought from
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the case law of the ECtHR. 152 The court was not even making the limited use of human rights law that was made of it in Krombach. On a reference to the ECJ, 153 that Court followed the approach in Krombach and held that a Member State may refuse to recognize insolvency proceedings opened in another Member State where the decision to open the proceedings was taken in flagrant breach of the fundamental right to be heard, which a person concerned by such proceedings enjoys. 154 This uses the language of rights and, as in Krombach, reference was made to the case-law of the ECJ expressly recognizing the general principle of Community law that everyone is entitled to a fair legal process. 155 
(c) The impact on the natural justice defence
When considering the impact of Article 6 on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments it is important not just to look at the results in particular cases but also at the impact on the development of rules of private international law. Prior to Krombach, Article 6(1) of the ECHR was used by a German court 156 to provide guidance on the question whether there was due service in the judgment granting State as required by Article 27(2) of the Brussels Convention (now Article 34(2) of the Brussels I Regulation). The case concerned service by remise au parquet (lodging documents with the Public Prosecution Service in France) in the French judgment granting State. This is designed to save a French plaintiff the trouble of service abroad. It increases the likelihood that the defendant will receive documents in a language with which he is unfamiliar. In deciding that this did not constitute due and timely service, as required by Article 27(2), the Oberlandesgericht, Karlsruhe, pointed out that Article 6(1) of the ECHR requires not only effective legal protection for the plaintiff but also understandable information for the defendant by means of clear, formalized requirements. Following Krombach, such a case could be dealt with now by using the public policy defence. The use of Article 6(1) requirements as guidance on whether there has been a breach of a fundamental right leading to the use of the public policy defence is likely to lead to an increase in the use of that defence and a corresponding decrease in the use of the natural justice defence under what is now Article 34(2) of the Brussels I Regulation. As an example of this phenomenon, the Maronier case was argued in the alternative as involving the natural justice defence and the Court of Appeal acknowledged that the facts of the case had some similarities to a leading case on that defence. 157 Nonetheless, Maronier was decided on public policy grounds. Krombach can be used to deal with cases that fall outside the natural justice defence under Article 34 (2) . This was always a limited defence in that it only applied where a judgment had been given in default of appearance. Cases where there has been a breach of the right to a fair trial abroad because of service of the document instituting the proceedings can now be dealt with under the public policy defence, even though the defendant has appeared. Of course, the public policy defence goes wider than Article 34(2), which only deals with one aspect of the right to a fair trial, 158 ie service in sufficient time and in such a way as to enable the defendant to arrange for his defence. The public policy defence can deal with other aspects of this right which do not arise from deficient service. 159
(d) Recognition and enforcement under the traditional rules
The approach applied in Brussels regime cases is doubtless equally applicable in cases of enforcement of foreign judgments under the traditional English common law rules. This is apparent from the Al-Bassam case where it will be recalled that the Court of Appeal said that the human rights dimension would come into play when the English court is applying the common law rules on enforcement of foreign judgments. This would have to be through the use of the public policy defence. Indeed, it is noticeable that one of the cases referred to by the Court of Appeal was the Maronier case.
In cases of enforcement of foreign judgments under the traditional rules, not only has the concept of public policy had light cast on it by Article 6 but so also has the concept of the interests of justice for the purposes of recognizing a foreign confiscation order under the Criminal Justice Act 1988. In 160 the Court of Appeal accepted that the jurisprudence under Article 6 may shed light on what is to be regarded as in the interests of justice in this particular context. 161 However, it went on to say that, in the majority of cases, it would not be necessary to refer in detail to the ECHR jurisprudence.
Government of the United States of America v Montgomery (No 2),
The demands of justice and transfer of procedings abroad
To get a balanced view of the impact of Article 6 it is important to look at areas where one might have expected the courts to use Article 6 to shine light on a private international law concept but have not done so. The basic criterion in cases of forum non conveniens is the interests of the parties and the ends of justice. 162 In determining whether justice demands that a stay should not be granted, the court has to consider all the circumstances of the
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case. 163 These have included evidence of delay in trial in the alternative forum abroad and a lack of legal representation abroad. When deciding whether trial abroad in such circumstances would amount to an injustice the courts have not used Article 6 of the ECHR and the jurisprudence on this as their yardstick. 164 Yet the ECtHR has had to determine when delay in a country involves a breach of Article 6. 165 Likewise it has had to determine when lack of legal representation 166 will constitute a breach of that Article.
IV. WHY ARTICLE 6 HAS HAD SUCH LITTLE IMPACT
A. Human rights concerns dealt with under existing principles of private international law
A recurring theme in the English case-law rejecting an argument based on Article 6 concerns is that such concerns are dealt with under existing principles of private international law. 172 the Court of Appeal rejected the Article 6 argument in favour of deciding the case using the private international law criterion, assuming that this would meet the human rights requirement. More generally, the approach whereby human rights law is used to cast light on the meaning of private international law concepts is effectively using existing rules to deal with human rights concerns. This theme is not confined to the English courts. There is an element of it in Krombach v Bamberski. 173 The ECJ said that they had consistently held that fundamental rights formed an integral part of the general principles whose observance the Court ensures 174 and that it drew inspiration from guidelines supplied by international treaties for the protection of human rights on which Member States have collaborated, with the ECHR being of particular significance. It went on to mention that the ECJ has expressly recognized the general principle of Community law that everyone is entitled to a fair process, which is inspired by those fundamental rights. 175 
B. Human rights concerns are overridden by other concerns
Concerns about an individual's human rights can clash with and be overridden by other concerns. The ECJ has been concerned to uphold the objectives of the Brussels system at the expense of human rights considerations, giving more weight to State interests than to an individual's interests. 176 The dictates of international law may also override human rights considerations.
Upholding the objectives of the Brussels system
The ECJ in the much criticized Erich Gasser case 177 was concerned to uphold the objectives of the Brussels Convention. It will be recalled that the Court said, in response to the argument that Article 21 should be set aside where the court first seised belongs to a Member State in whose courts there are, in
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general, excessive delays in dealing with cases, that this 'would be manifestly contrary both to the letter and spirit and to the aim of the Convention'. 178 The mutual trust and the desire for legal certainty that lay at the heart of the Convention would be breached by such an exception. 179 In Krombach, the way in which recourse was had to the public policy solution under the Brussels Convention, rather than to the human rights indirect effect solution, has implicit in it a value judgment that the EC rules and their objectives override the human rights rules and their objectives. The higher precedence of the EC rules came out even stronger in the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Maronier v Larmer, 180 where the introduction of the strong presumption that the procedures of other signatories of the ECHR were compliant with Article 6 was prompted by concerns that the facilitation of the free movement of judgments under the Brussels Convention should not be frustrated by the court in the enforcing State having to carry out a detailed review of whether the procedures in the judgment granting State complied with Article 6. 181
The dictates of international law
In the area of State immunity, there may be a clash between the dictates of international law and human rights requirements, a clash between the interests of the State and those of the individual. This has been acknowledged by the ECtHR in Al-Adsani v United Kingdom, which was followed by the House of Lords in Jones v Saudi Arabia. 182 A majority of the ECtHR, 183 when considering whether the sovereign immunity restriction on access was compatible with Article 6, said that 'The grant of sovereign immunity to a State in civil proceedings pursues the legitimate aim of complying with international law to promote comity and good relations between States through the respect of another State's sovereignty'. 184 On the issue of whether the restriction was proportionate to the aim pursued, the ECtHR went on to say that 'measures . . . which reflect generally recognized rules of public international law on State immunity cannot in principle be regarded as imposing a disproportionate restriction on the access to a court as embodied in Article 6(1) . . . some restrictions on access must be regarded as inherent, an example being those limitations generally accepted by the community as part of the doctrine of State immunity'. 185
C. Not wanting to get involved with the complexities of human rights law
The Montgomery case 186 is an example of this. The Court of Appeal accepted that the jurisprudence under Article 6 may be relevant (in an indirect way) in shedding light on what is to be regarded as being in the interests of justice under the recognition criteria. However, in the majority of cases it was unnecessary to refer in detail to this jurisprudence. 'The desirability of not becoming too closely engaged with the jurisprudence relating to Article 6 is emphasised by the fact that the jurisprudence can be technical.' 187 By way of illustration it was said that the requirements of Article 6 differ depending on whether the proceedings involve 'the determination of a criminal charge' and that whether a criminal charge is involved is itself a technical issue. A court may not want to get involved with the complexities of human rights law because it does not regard itself as being the best body to do this. This comes out in the arguments put by the Commission in the Gasser case against introducing an exception to Article 21 of the Brussels Convention based on delay in the court first seised. It was argued that the question whether delay was such that the interests of a party may be seriously affected can be determined only on the basis of an appraisal taking account of all the circumstances of the case. According to the Commission, that cannot be determined in the context of the Brussels Convention. 'It is for the ECtHR to examine the issue and the national courts cannot substitute themselves for it by recourse to Art 21 of the Convention.' 188 In Lubbe, Lord Bingham may not have wanted to get involved with the complexities of Article 6 of the ECHR. This would have been understandable, given that the Convention was all very new to the English courts. Indeed, the case was decided at a time when the Human Rights Act was not yet in force. Now that the English courts are familiar with Article 6 there is no need for any such hesitancy.
D. A failure to realize the importance of human rights in private international law
The discussion of human rights in the British case-law has been in response to argument raised by counsel. However, counsel sometimes fail to realize the importance of human rights, do not raise the point and fail to draw the attention of the court to the relevant decisions of the ECtHR. The court will not raise the human rights point of its own motion. It is for the party raising the issue of non-compatibility with Article 6(1) to demonstrate that this provision has been breached. 189 But even where counsel raises the human rights point,
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the court may not respond to this adequately. This represents a failure sometimes by judges to realize the importance of human rights in private international law cases. A good illustration is the judgment of the House of Lords in Mark v Mark. 190 It will be recalled that Baroness Hale held that there never was a blanket limitation preventing a person not lawfully in the UK from being regarded as being habitually resident there so there was no need to recast the limitation in the light of Article 6. This contrasts with the approach of Mance LJ in the Court of Appeal in Jones v Saudi Arabia. There it was decided that quite apart from the human rights point a State cannot possess any absolute right to claim immunity in respect of civil claims against its officials for systematic torture. 191 Nonetheless, the human rights position was still considered and the appeal was decided in the light of the ECHR. 192 Mance LJ said that he was concerned to reach a conclusion that reflects the importance attaching in today's world and in current international thinking and jurisprudence to the recognition and effective enforcement of individual human rights. 193 Baroness Hale was evidently not so concerned and can be accused of not taking human rights seriously, at least in this area of private international law. If the issue of human rights arises in a mainstream area such as immigration and asylum then the importance of human rights is obvious, not always so in private international law. Indeed, Baroness Hale, in the previous year, had given learned judgments on human rights in an expulsion case 194 and in a child abduction case. 195 Likewise, one can contrast the full discussion of human rights by Lord Bingham in an expulsion case 196 with the failure by the same judge to discuss human rights in the earlier Lubbe case. But in both cases it is arguable that the problem was essentially the same, the transfer, in the former of a person and in the latter of proceedings, to a country where there would be a breach of Article 6 standards. If one goes on to ask why there has been a failure to realize the importance of human rights law in private international law cases, one obvious explanation is the complete absence of decisions of the ECtHR applying human rights principles in this context. The operation of the indirect effect doctrine in private international law cases is particularly uncertain. The argument for saying this doctrine should have an impact rests on drawing analogies: that the transfer of an action abroad in cases of forum non conveniens is analogous to transferring a person abroad; and in the case of enforcement of a foreign judgment, that Pellegrini is akin to a private international law cases of enforcement of a foreign judgment.
E. Getting it wrong
The best example of the courts 197 getting human rights law wrong is
Government of the United States of America v Montgomery (No 2).
The Court of Appeal seemed to be oblivious to the indirect effect doctrine, even though it considered (and distinguished) Soering v United Kingdom, 198 the case in which that doctrine had originated. It was also oblivious to the jurisprudence applying this doctrine to cases of enforcement of foreign judgments. The leading cases on enforcement, Drozd 199 and Pellegrini, 200 were not cited by counsel or referred to by the Court of Appeal. These errors were not repeated in the House of Lords, where the full discussion of the indirect effect doctrine was doubtless helped by the fact that that Court had recently had to consider this doctrine in the mainstream human rights context of expulsion of immigrants.
But their Lordships, by confining Pellegrini to its facts, appear to have got the law wrong. Pellegrini was distinguished on the basis that it turned on the relationship between the Italian civil courts and the Vatican court, as regulated by the Concordat. But there is nothing in the section of the judgment of the ECtHR setting out 'The Law' to suggest that the decision turned on this relationship. This relationship was not examined and the Concordat was not even mentioned in this section. 201 The only clear statement of law that was made was one whereby the ECtHR described its task as not being to examine whether the proceedings before the Vatican courts complied with Article 6 of the Convention, but to examine whether the Italian courts, before authorizing enforcement of the decision annulling the marriage, duly satisfied themselves that the Vatican proceedings fulfilled the guarantees of Article 6. 202 This is clearly not intended to be confined to the facts of the case since the ECtHR went on to say that 'such a check is required, in fact, where the judgment for which confirmation and execution is sought emanates from the courts of a country which does not apply the Convention'. This part of the sentence was rather cavalierly dismissed by Lord Carswell as 'too frail a peg' on which to hang the wider interpretation of Pellegrini on which the appellant's counsel sought to rely. Others have not taken this narrow view of Pellegrini. 203 
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Moreover, the subsequent decision of the ECtHR in K v Italy, 204 which concerned a breach of the applicant's Article 6 rights by Italy because of its failure to enforce a Polish order for maintenance payments within a reasonable time, appears to regard Pellegrini as dealing with the same two State situation. Another example of getting it wrong can be found in Al-Bassam v AlBassam. 205 Lord Justice Chadwick, giving the unanimous judgment of the Court, said that 'It is not for the English court to restrain a party in proceedings before it from suing in another jurisdiction on the grounds of its own perception as to the fairness or unfairness of proceedings in that other jurisdiction-a fortiori, where the country in which the party seeks to sue is not itself bound by the European Convention '. 206 This suggests that the fact that Saudi Arabia is a non-Convention country in itself rules out arguments based on a breach of human rights in that country. The human rights jurisprudence says exactly the opposite. 207 
V. A NEW APPROACH
The English courts should adopt an approach which takes human rights more seriously. What is needed is a hybrid human rights/private international law approach. This would have two stages. The first stage is concerned with identifying a human rights problem. This means ascertaining whether, in the circumstances of a particular case, there is a real risk of a breach, or has been a breach, of Article 6 standards in England or abroad. 207a Human rights jurisprudence should be used to identify such a breach. So at this stage human rights law would have primacy. This would not only ensure that any breach is identified but would also guarantee compliance with the obligation of English courts to 'take account of' decisions of the ECtHR. 208 The English courts should ensure that they are not acting in a way which involves a breach of Article 6 under the direct effect doctrine. Where there has been a breach abroad, or there is a real risk that there will be such a breach, the English courts should not act in a way which involves a possible breach of Article 6 by them under the indirect effect doctrine.
The second stage is concerned with solving the human rights problem that has been identified. There are two alternative ways in which this could be achieved. 209 The first is to give the ECHR primacy and use the fact that, to act in a particular way would involve a possible breach of the ECHR by an English court, as the ground for not so acting (the human rights solution). This was the approach adopted by Lord Carswell in Government of the United States of America v Montgomery (No 2) . 210 The second possible approach is to use the rules of private international law to achieve the same end (the private international law solution). In the areas of highest risk of encountering a breach of Article 6 standards, namely transferring actions abroad to a State where there is a real risk of a breach of Article 6 standards and enforcing a foreign judgment where there has been such a breach, there is no need to introduce new rules of private international law. It is possible to use the flexibility inherent in existing private international law concepts to deal with human rights concerns. Thus the public policy exception can be used, and has been used, as a ground for not enforcing a foreign judgment in a case where there has been a breach of Article 6 standards in the judgment granting State. And the concept of what justice demands can be used to prevent transfer of an action abroad to a country where there is a real risk of a breach of Article 6 standards. The decision as to which solution a State should adopt should not be a matter of concern to the ECtHR. 211 It is submitted that, at this second stage, the private international law solution is the one to be preferred. This is for a very obvious practical reason. The difficulty with giving human rights law primacy and acting according to its dictates is the uncertainty as to what it demands. Under the human rights solution, what an English court is saying is that it will not enforce a foreign judgment or transfer abroad where to do so would mean an English court would be in breach. This raises the whole question of the application of the indirect effect doctrine to private international law cases. Giving private international law primacy avoids having to decide whether an English court would be in breach under the indirect effect doctrine. Instead, the only question is whether there has been a breach by the foreign court (in an enforcement case) or a real risk that there will be such a breach (in a transfer case). If the answer is yes, then the private international law concept can come into play to prevent enforcement or transfer. The operation of this two stage approach will now be examined in more detail.
A. Transfer of proceedings abroad
We have seen that, at the moment, there is a danger that proceedings will be transferred abroad by virtue of the doctrine of forum non conveniens to a country in which Article 6 standards are not complied with. Under the proposed hybrid human rights/private international law approach, the first stage is to ascertain whether, in the circumstances of a particular case, there is a real risk of a breach of the right to a fair trial abroad. The Strasbourg jurisprudence would be used to identify the risk of such a breach. The Strasbourg jurisprudence would also be used to see if there is a real risk of a flagrant breach. If there is, there is then at least the possibility that, under the indirect effect doctrine, this could lead to a breach of Article 6 by the English courts. This is the case, regardless of whether the country abroad is a Convention country or not. Moving on to the second stage, the human rights problem can be solved by the English courts ensuring that they do not stay English proceedings in a case where there is a real risk 212 of the denial of the right to a fair trial in the alternative forum abroad. This would not require any alteration in Spiliada principles. A stay would be refused under the second stage of those principles on the basis that justice demands trial in England. But any case where there is a real risk of a breach of Article 6 principles would necessarily mean that there is injustice abroad. This is more emphatic than merely using human rights jurisprudence to 'cast light' on the meaning of the private international law concept of the demands of justice. It is completely unambiguous what the effect of human rights law is. In contrast, casting light has the idea of guidance but leaves open the question whether this guidance must be followed. This suggested solution should apply whenever in a particular case there is a real risk of a breach of Article 6 standards abroad. This is not the same as a real risk of a breach of Article 6 abroad. The foreign country may not be a Contracting State to the ECHR but that should not matter. The use of Article 6 standards provides an objective yardstick justifying the English court's refusal to refer the proceedings abroad. 213 Under this suggested solution the real risk of a breach of Article 6 in a particular case would be subsumed within the private international law concept of injustice abroad. The latter does, however, go wider than the former since it covers instances other than those involving procedural unfairness. For example, it has been held that it is not conducive to justice to require a claimant, who had an arguable claim under what English law would regard as the applicable law, to litigate abroad in a country which would summarily reject the claimant's action because under its law, which it would apply, there was a total defence to an action for breach of contract. 214 Article 6 protects the individual's access to the courts for the determination of his civil rights; it does not affect the democratic power of the State to determine the scope of those rights. 215 Article 6 is not concerned with the substantive content of national law 216 and would therefore not cover this example.
B. A different result?
In cases of alleged procedural unfairness, is this new hybrid human rights/ private international law approach going to produce a different result, bringing cases within the concept of injustice abroad that are not covered at the moment or excluding cases that are covered? In many cases it will not do so. If, for example, the allegation is one of lack of judicial independence, the real difficulty is finding factual evidence to back up this allegation, 217 rather than finding criteria to say what constitutes a lack of judicial independence. Even where there is clear evidence of what is taking place abroad, the suggested approach is in most cases unlikely to produce a different result.
(a) No exclusion of cases that are covered at the moment by the concept of injustice abroad
Cases of procedural unfairness constituting injustice abroad (in the private international law sense) will doubtless involve the real risk of a breach of human rights abroad. This means that there will be no exclusion of cases that are covered at the moment under the concept of injustice abroad. This can be seen by looking at the situation where there is no legal aid abroad. The leading private international law cases are Connelly v RTZ Corpn plc 218 and Lubbe v Cape PLC. 219 In the former case, it was said that, as a general rule, the court will not refuse to grant a stay simply because the plaintiff has shown that no financial assistance, for example in the form of legal aid, will be available to him in the appropriate forum abroad, whereas such financial assistance will be available to him in England. 220 However, this was an exceptional case since it was clear that the nature and complexity of the instant case was such that it could not be tried at all without the benefit of financial assistance. 221 
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Accordingly, substantial justice would not be done in the particular circumstances of the case if the plaintiff had to proceed in the appropriate forum where no financial assistance was available. 222 Likewise, the circumstances in Lubbe v Cape PLC 223 were special and unusual. If the English proceedings were stayed in favour of the more appropriate forum in South Africa the probability was that the plaintiffs would have no means of obtaining the professional representation and the expert evidence which would be essential if their claims were to be justly decided. 224 This would amount to a denial of justice.
Under the proposed approach, it would have to be asked whether, in the circumstances in Connelly and Lubbe, there is a real risk of a breach of Article 6 standards in, respectively, Namibia and South Africa. It would appear that there is. This can be seen by examining the leading ECtHR case on the lack of legal representation in civil proceedings, Airey v Ireland. 225 A wife complained that because of the prohibitive cost of proceedings she could not obtain a judicial separation and that her right of access to a court was effectively barred. No legal aid was available at that time in Ireland for the purposes of seeking a judicial separation or for any civil matter. The wife was unable to find a solicitor willing to act on her behalf in judicial separation proceedings, apparently because she would have been unable to meet the costs involved. The wife could appear before the High Court without a lawyer but the ECtHR thought it improbable that a person in her position could effectively present her own case, given the complexity of the domestic judicial procedure. The ECtHR said that Article 6(1) 'may sometimes compel the State to provide for the assistance of a lawyer when such assistance proves indispensable for an effective access to court either because legal representation is rendered compulsory, as is done by the domestic law of certain Contracting States for various types of litigation, or by reason of the complexity of the procedure or of the case'. 226 On the facts, it was held that the wife did not enjoy an effective right of access to the High Court in Ireland for the purpose of petitioning for a decree of judicial separation. Accordingly, there had been a breach of Article 6(1).
Similarly, cases of inordinate delay abroad would be decided no differently under the proposed approach from under the existing approach. In cases of forum non conveniens and forum conveniens, inordinate delay before an action comes to trial abroad has been held to be a denial of justice. 227 An example is where there was evidence that more than 10 years delay was usual in Indonesia. 228 Article 6 provides that everyone is entitled to a hearing within a reasonable time. The same period of delay of 10 years has been held to constitute a breach of Article 6. 229 
(b) Bringing new cases within the concept of injustice abroad
Many cases of procedural unfairness where, under the current law, an allegation of injustice (in the private international law sense) abroad has been rejected by the English courts will also be ones where there is no real risk of a breach of Article 6 either. This would be the case where, for example, the period of delay abroad is very short. However, in a difficult borderline case of delay abroad, where the allegation of injustice abroad has been rejected by the English courts, there may, nonetheless, be a real risk of a breach of Article 6 abroad. The suggested approach would then produce a different answer, bringing such a case for the first time within the concept of injustice abroad. There was no injustice abroad in a case where there was a four or even up to six years delay from commencement of proceedings to disposal of an appeal in the Czech Republic. 230 Neither was evidence of four to five years delay in India, 231 and even possibly up to 10 years, enough to show that substantial justice cannot be done in India. 232 In these last examples, is there a real risk of a breach of Article 6 standards according to the jurisprudence of the ECtHR? In Salesi v Italy, 233 the ECtHR held that the right to a hearing within a reasonable time had not been met where, from commencement of proceedings to their ending with the filing of the Court of Cassation's judgment, took a little over six years. The reasonableness of the length of proceedings is determined by criteria laid down by the case-law of the ECtHR and in the light of the circumstances of the case. 234 It was relevant that the case was not a complex one and that the claimant's conduct did not substantially contribute to the length of the proceedings. 235 Article 6(1) of the ECHR and Private International Law 41
The Court was critical of the fact that on appeal the case remained dormant for over two years and the fact that it took eight months and six months respectively to make known the reasons supporting the District Court's and the Court of Cassation's judgments by filing these at the relevant registries. 236 The Government of Italy had argued that a factor in their favour was the excessive work load of the appellate courts. 237 The ECtHR rejected this argument, saying that States were under a duty to organize their judicial systems so the courts can meet the requirements of Article 6. In the light of this decision, there is a good argument that a delay in India of four to five years in trial, let alone dealing with any subsequent appeals, would involve a real risk of a breach of Article 6 standards. 238 One factor that was considered when looking at delay under the private international law criteria was that India was tackling the delay problem and the problem was not as bad as it used to be. 239 In the context of private international law, this could be regarded as being relevant for reasons of comity. But such concern with the reaction of foreign States and England's relations with these States would not be relevant for deciding if there is a real risk of a breach using human rights criteria, where the concern is with an individual's rights. Other factors that have been taken into account in assessing whether delay amounts to injustice abroad are comparing the delay in the Czech Republic with that in other modern European States and asking whether the delay in the Czech Republic was dramatically greater than that in England. 240 These are understandable criteria in the context of forum non conveniens where what is being considered is whether trial should be in England or abroad. Again these factors do not appear to be relevant for deciding if there is a real risk of a breach using human rights criteria. If these private international law factors, which operate to say that the delay is not inordinate, are removed from the equation this may well produce a different result Arguably there would be a real risk of a breach of Article 6 standards abroad and, under the suggested approach, this should be treated as a case of injustice abroad and a stay of English proceedings would then be refused.
Under the EC regime
The present approach is to deal with human rights concerns in enforcement cases by using the doctrine of public policy, employing Article 6 to cast light on the meaning of this concept. This should normally mean that the English courts do not act in breach of Article 6. However, it is possible that this may still happen, as the example, set out below, involving bias abroad, shows. The effect of Pellegrini is that the English courts must never enforce a foreign judgment granted in a non-ECHR State, and arguably even in an ECHR State, in circumstances where there has been a breach of Article 6 standards. 241 If the breach is a flagrant one the English court must never enforce the foreign judgment, regardless of whether the judgment is granted in an ECHR Contracting State or not. 242 To achieve this, the present law needs tightening up in two respects: first in relation to identifying the breach abroad; second, in relation to the response of the recognizing court to such a breach. The proposed hybrid human rights/private international law approach will do this.
The first stage of this approach is for the court to ascertain whether, in the circumstances of a particular case, there has been a breach of the right to a fair trial abroad. Taking this as the starting point increases the likelihood that any breach abroad will be identified. Under the present law, the starting point is the defence of public policy, rather than the breach as such. As has been seen, cases of a failure to provide a fair trial abroad have been decided on public policy grounds without even asking if there has been a breach of Article 6 standards in that country. 243 Also if the case is argued as one of, for example, a lack of natural justice, the question of public policy and hence of a breach of Article 6 may not be raised. Moreover, under the present English law, as set out in Maronier v Larmer, applying a presumption of compliance with Article 6 requirements abroad is not the best way of finding out if there has actually been compliance. The English courts have not always used the jurisprudence of the ECtHR to determine whether there has been a breach. 244 Using this jurisprudence will obviously help in the identification process.
Moving on to the second stage of solving the problem once a breach abroad has been identified, it is important to make absolutely sure that the English courts do not recognize the foreign judgment. When it comes to the means of achieving this, the human rights solution not only involves the usual problem of ascertaining what human rights law demands but also, in the present context, involves a clash between the EC rules and their values and the human rights rules and their values. The ECJ may well favour the former over the latter. The better solution is to use the existing public policy defence to achieve the desired result, providing that there is some tightening up of when this defence would operate. Using this defence, the courts automatically should hold that enforcement would be against public policy where there has been a breach of Article 6 standards in the judgment granting State. Human rights standards would therefore be subsumed within public policy but the latter would go wider than this since it covers matters other than fair process, for example instances of fraud. This tightens up the existing law by ensuring that the foreign judgment will definitely not be enforced. Under the present law using Article 6 to 'cast light' on the concept of public policy has the idea of guidance but leaves open the question whether this guidance must always be followed. The use of Article 6 standards provides an objective yardstick justifying the recognizing court's refusal to recognize and enforce a foreign judgment.
Under traditional English rules
The English traditional rules on enforcement of foreign judgments present much more of a blank canvas on which the English courts can work to ensure that a foreign judgment will not be enforced where there has been a breach of Article 6 standards abroad. When it comes to ensuring that a breach abroad is identified there is a danger under the current law that the English courts will apply the same approach as in Maronier v Larmer and presume that there has been compliance with Article 6 standards abroad. 245 Applying the proposed hybrid human rights/private international law approach will avoid this happening. Under the first stage of that approach, the court must ascertain whether, in the circumstances of a particular case, there has been a breach of the right to a fair trial abroad. Moving on to the second stage of solving the human rights problem once a breach abroad has been identified, there is more freedom of action under the traditional rules than in EC cases. It has been seen that the House of Lords in Government of the United States of America v Montgomery (No 2) has accepted that an English court will be in breach of Article 6 if it enforces a foreign judgment granted in circumstances where there has been a flagrant breach of Article 6 standards. It would be possible therefore in this context to use the human rights solution to refuse enforcement of the foreign judgment but it would require a finding that there had been a 'flagrant' breach. Avoiding this requirement would need the English courts to recognize that the effect of Pellegrini is that an English court will be in breach of Article 6 if it enforces a foreign judgment where there has been a breach of Article 6 standards, even if this is not flagrant. But this would be contrary to the view of the House of Lords in the Montgomery case and this would need to be overturned. The private international law solution does not require this, or a finding that there has been a 'flagrant' breach abroad. In cases of enforcement at common law, the English courts could introduce a new defence that a foreign judgment will not be recognized or enforced in cases where there has been a breach of Article 6 standards abroad. But this is not necessary. It is possible to use the existing public policy defence to achieve the same result, providing there is some tightening up of when this defence would operate.
Using this defence the courts should automatically hold that enforcement would be against public policy where there has been a breach of Article 6 standards abroad. 246 Adopting this approach has the virtue of consistency with the approach adopted in EC cases, something that appeals to the English courts. 247 When it comes to statutory enforcement based on bilateral conventions, using the existing public policy defence contained therein will avoid a clash between the bilateral conventions and the ECHR. 248
A different result?
It is instructive to look at the situation where there is an allegation of bias in the judgment granting State. Under the traditional rules on enforcement this is regarded as raising the defence of a lack of natural justice. This is what happened in Jacobson v Frachon, 249 where it was held that a French judgment was not against natural justice, even though an expert appointed by the French court to examine the quality of goods was a relative of the defendant, made no proper examination and refused to hear the evidence of the plaintiffs and their witnesses. Although this expert was found to have a biased and prejudiced mind, the plaintiffs had not been prevented from presenting their case to the court. The plaintiffs were at liberty to produce witnesses to the court and to attack the report and did so without success. Under the suggested approach it would have to be asked, at the first stage, whether there was a breach of Article 6 standards in the judgment granting State. Article 6(1) establishes the right to a hearing before an independent and impartial tribunal. There are two aspects to the requirement of impartiality: 'First, the tribunal must be subjectively free of personal prejudice or bias. Secondly, it must also be impartial from any objective viewpoint, that is, it must offer sufficient guarantees to exclude any legitimate doubt in this respect . . .' 250 If a judge in a tribunal (and this can include an expert lay member who is not a professional judge) 251 is subjectively biased there will be a breach of Article 6(1). It is unclear whether this can be extended to a case of an expert who is not a judge (ie is not actually involved in the decision-making process). This still leaves the possibility that the tribunal may be regarded as not being impartial from an objective viewpoint in that it appoints an expert who is biased. It is arguable that the reasonable bystander-a fully informed layman who has no axe to grind-would on objective grounds fear the court lacked impartiality. What is clear is that the ECtHR has not been guided by the criterion of whether the applicant has been able to present its side of the case. In conclusion, it is possible that, in the circumstances in Jacobson, there would be a breach of Article 6 standards. If so, moving on to the second stage, it should automatically follow that the public policy defence would apply.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The impact of Article 6 of the ECHR on the rules of private international law and their application has been slight. There has been no impact on the bases of jurisdiction or the exercise of the discretionary element under the English traditional rules, and no exception to the lis pendens rule under the Brussels Convention (now Regulation) has been made. Article 6 has, in one instance, not led to the removal of a blanket limitation on jurisdiction. But in another instance it has so led. Such a limitation can operate so as to deny the claimant access to the English courts, constituting the breach by the English courts of the right to a fair hearing. However, the nature of private international law, being concerned with disputes with a foreign element, necessarily means that the English courts are commonly going to be faced with a breach of Article 6 requirements abroad. Indeed, in private international law cases, Article 6 concerns have been raised before the English courts more commonly in relation to an action abroad than in relation to an English action. And it is in the context of breaches abroad that Article 6 has had its greatest impact. In cases of recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, Article 6 has been taken into account to shine light on the concept of public policy, which operates as a defence to recognition and enforcement. The reasons for the lack of impact of Article 6 on private international law are many and varied: human rights concerns are regarded as being dealt with under existing principles of private international law; human rights concerns are overridden by other concerns, in particular the desire to uphold the objectives of the Brussels system; there has been a wish not to get involved with the complexities of human rights law; there has also been a failure to realize the importance of human rights in private international law; and the courts simply have got human rights law wrong. Whilst the English courts and the ECJ have at times been misguided, this is all too understandable. It is by no means always clear what human rights law requires, particularly in relation to the response in one country to a breach of Article 6 standards in another country.
A new approach is needed which takes human rights more seriously. A hybrid human rights/private international law approach should be adopted. The first stage of this requires the court to ascertain whether, in the circumstances of a particular case, there has been, or there is a real risk that there will be, a breach of Article 6 standards in England or abroad. Human rights jurisprudence should be used to ascertain whether there is such a breach. The second stage involves solving the human rights problem that has been identified. The English courts should act in a way that ensures that they are not in breach of Article 6 standards. In the areas of greatest risk of encountering a breach of Article 6 standards, this can be achieved by using existing private international law concepts of public policy and the demands of justice. This would have the greatest impact on stays of action, with some borderline cases, that currently fall outside the concept of injustice abroad, now likely to come within this concept on the basis that trial abroad would involve a real risk of a breach of Article 6 standards, leading to the refusal of a stay of English proceedings. By so doing, the English courts will have reached a conclusion that, in the words of Mance LJ (as he then was), reflects the importance attaching in today's world and in current international thinking and jurisprudence to the recognition and effective enforcement of individual human rights. 252 This will also be in accordance with the ECtHR's view that Convention rights must be guaranteed in a way that is 'practical and effective '. 253 
